"functional" departments in the Secretariat and thereby permitted the Sovnarkom greater autonomy in industrial management. In contrast, when Stalin sought to emphasize the Secretariat's "economic work" he urged the creation of "production branch" departments within the Secretariat and thereby limited the Sovnarkom's autonomy.
In his report to the Sixteenth Congress of the VKP(b) in mid-1930, Stalin implied that the Secretariat should focus on "party-political work" and that the Sovnarkom, directly supervised by the Politburo, should enjoy primary responsibility for industrial administration. In order to assure this division of labor, Stalin approved the formation of "functional" departments for personnel management, cadre education, and supervision of the fulfillment of existing decrees within the Secretariat; dramatized the Sovnarkom's industrial responsibilities in a number of public addresses; and, in December 1930, increased the number of Politburo members with responsibilities in the Sovnarkom (the Politburo commissars). 2 In early 1934, however, Stalin found fault with this division of labor in his address to the Seventeenth Congress of the V K P ( b ) . He charged that "functionalism" hindered industrial development and urged the Secretariat to focus on "economic work" and to provide more "concrete leadership" of industry. Further, he approved the establishment of "production branch" departments to improve the Secretariat's ability to supervise and intervene in the Sovnarkom's industrial administration.
3 Three years later Stalin again dramatically reversed himself. In early 1937 he told the CC that party officials had become preoccupied with "economic work" and had neglected "partypolitical" work. He called for greater attention to the theoretical education of party members, which he described as the "mastery of Bolshevism." 4 Zhdanov stressed the primacy of "party-political" work and therefore drew heavily on Stalin's address to the CC in early 1937 and his report to the Eighteenth Congress. Although Zhdanov considered all components of "party-political work" significant, he particularly emphasized the Secretariat's supervision and direction of party members' theoretical education which was to be based on "independent study" of the Kratkii kurs (Short Course) and other materials. Zhdanov sought to limit the Secretariat's "economic work" by circumscribing party officials' means to intervene in the Sovnarkom's industrial administration and by supporting the "functional" organization of the Secretariat approved by the Eighteenth Congress.
Zhdanov's stress on "party-political work" reflected his conception of the Secretariat's leadership of the V K P ( b ) . Zhdanov apparently believed that the Secretariat could lead the party most effectively by concentrating on the recruitment, assignment, education, and monitoring of individual party members. If the Secretariat dealt with these matters successfully, the Communists who manned the state structure would not need constant Secretariat interference (derided as "petty tutelage"). Party officials would then be free to supervise and coordinate a wide range of social, economic, and other activities, thus providing "political leadership" for the society as a whole.
Malenkov, on the contrary, gave primacy to the Secretariat's "economic work" and therefore drew heavily on Stalin's address to the Seventeenth Congress of the VKP(b) which called on the Secretariat to provide industry with "concrete guidance." Although Malenkov was deeply involved in personnel management, he had little sympathy for certain other components of "party-political work," particularly for the formal study of MarxistLeninist texts. Malenkov gave highest priority to the Secretariat's supervision and intervention in the Sovnarkom's industrial administration, and during 1939-41 he sought to restore the "production branch" departments which had been created in 1934 and dismantled in 1939. In his report to the Eighteenth Conference of the VKP(b) in 1941, Malenkov implied that theoretical study had little importance for effective industrial management and recommended the appointment of a large number of specialized secretaries for industry and transport to improve the Secretariat's supervision and participation in the Sovnarkom's industrial administration.
Malenkov's ordering of priorities also reflected his basic conception of the Secretariat's role. He clearly regarded concentration on "party-political work" as insufficient for the Secretariat to lead the party as a whole. For Malenkov, "political leadership" was apparently far too abstract a concept; he insisted on Secretariat "leadership of the economy" which meant the party officials' active intervention in the solution of immediate production problems.
In his report to the Eighteenth Congress, Stalin had implied that the Secretariat should focus on "party-political work." He declared that Engels's prognosis about the "withering away" of the state was incorrect and insisted that the Soviet state should play a central role in economic development. Stalin's formulations concerning the state implied that the Sovnarkom should play a major role in industry and were endorsed by the Politburo commissars who dominated the Sovnarkom.
5
In his discussion of the V K P ( b ) , Stalin focused on two central components of "party-political work": the theoretical education of party members and personnel management. He insisted that mastery of Marxist-Leninist theory was essential for success in every field and that improved personnel management was critical to the implementation of the party's policies. He called for the establishment of a single directorate of cadres (upravlenie kadrov) with subordinate departments at the republic, krai, and oblast levels and a similarly organized agitprop directorate {upravlenie propagandy i agitatsii) to improve work in these two spheres. 6 Apparently following Stalin's lead, Zhdanov outlined his own preference for "party-political work" in a report on the new party rules. Zhdanov insisted that theoretical education of party members was the key to the VKP(b)'s success in assuring the "transition to communism" which had ostensibly begun at the Eighteenth Congress. He repeatedly asserted that the study of Marxist-Leninist theory, as embodied in the Kratkii kurs and other materials, would provide party members with the "perspective" vital for practical success. He also interpreted Stalin's report as sanctioning a limitation of the Secretariat's capacity to engage in "economic work." Stalin had implied that the "production branch" departments had hindered effective personnel management and Zhdanov called for their abolition, a reform which would have seriously weakened local party officials' control over industry. But Zhdanov sought to limit rather than eliminate the Secretariat's "economic work." He announced that henceforth the primary party organizations ( P P O ) in factories would enjoy the right to monitor the performance of the factory manager (pravo kontrolia) . Zhdanov's effort to define the "correct combination of economic and party-political work" at the enterprise level set the stage for subsequent conflict over the extent of PPO responsibilities vis-a-vis the factory manager who Zhdanov's conception of the Secretariat's role was incorporated into the party rules approved by the Eighteenth Congress. The VKP(b) was said to be "guided by Marxist-Leninist theory" in all its activity and all party members were obliged to "work indefatigably on raising their political consciousness, on the mastery of the fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism." The central and local industrial and transport departments of the Secretariat were dismantled, and PPOs in enterprises were granted pravo kontrolia.
11
Both Zhdanov and Malenkov had gained prominence in their respective specialties in the late 1930s, but Central Committee publications do not provide any evidence of conflict between them until after they had assumed the leadership of the two bureaucratic divisions created by the Eighteenth Congress. Immediately after the Eighteenth Congress, Malenkov became a secretary of the CC, a member of the Orgburo, and director of the new cadres directorate. In the latter capacity he apparently held responsibility for supervising industry as well as for personnel management. The new cadres directorate absorbed personnel from the dismantled "production branch" departments while its own local departments (otdel kadrov) which were headed by secretaries, provided "exacting supervision" of assigned personnel. Moreover, Malenkov soon became personally involved in detailed inspection of industrial activity. 13 Simultaneously, Zhdanov, who had been the leader of the Leningrad party organization and secretary of the CC since 1934, and responsible for Marxist-Leninist education since 1938, became a member of the Orgburo, a full member of the Politburo, and director of the newly formed agitprop directorate. The agitprop directorate was responsible for all political education and press activities. Its local departments, headed by secretaries, were responsible for training lecturers and other agitprop personnel, for supervising the press, and for both aiding and monitoring party members engaged in "independent study." 13. It is impossible to determine whether Malenkov was assigned the task of supervising industry or took it upon himself. Whatever the case, the journal he edited began to call for increased Secretariat "direction" of the economy soon after the Eighteenth The timing of these shifts suggests that official definition of Secretariat priorities was influenced by changes in the international political system. In particular, severe threats to Soviet security seemed to undermine support for Zhdanov's orientation in Stalin's Politburo.
The Politburo selected by the Eighteenth Congress was dominated by two groups of officials: the CC secretaries who led the Secretariat and the Politburo commissars who led the Sovnarkom. 10 It seems likely that in the aftermath of the Eighteenth Congress at least some Politburo commissars supported Zhdanov's emphasis on the Secretariat's "party-political work" in order to protect the Sovnarkom from Secretariat interference. Zhdanov's opposition to the "production branch" departments and his support for edinonachalie may have helped to forge an alliance against Malenkov's efforts to extend Secretariat controls in industry. Although the Politburo commissars may well have disagreed over economic priorities, they were probably willing to band together to protect Sovnarkom prerogatives. However, Zhdanov's alliance with the Politburo commissars was apparently undermined by the need to accelerate Soviet defense production in the face of threats to the USSR's security. The formal study of Marxism-Leninism and the PPO's limited supervision of industrial activity advocated by Zhdanov were apparently ineffective in increasing production. Moreover, the Sovnarkom's perennial inability to overcome production problems may well have undermined the Politburo commissars' capacity to defend Sovnarkom autonomy in the industrial field. In this context, the Soviet leadership endorsed Malenkov's view of the Secretariat's role as the most effective means to accelerate defense production. Immediately after the Eighteenth Congress the two major Central Committee journals began to clash over Secretariat priorities. While the agitprop organ declared that the theoretical education of all party members should be the Secretariat's highest priority, the cadre division organ implied that correct practice and experience in problem solving was the only basis for action and insisted that work with personnel and "direction of the economy" deserved highest priority.
17
But Pravda's editorials indicated that the Soviet leadership endorsed Zhdanov's orientation, 18 particularly after a Central Committee meeting in May 1939. 19 Pravda gave Zhdanov's report on the CC meeting to the Leningrad party organization front page coverage, and endorsed both his views on the significance of theoretical education and his definition of the "correct combination of economic and party-political work" at the enterprise level.
20
During this period Malenkov was not generally shown with other leading officials in public.
21
In this context, the agitprop leadership seemed to become even more assertive in pressing its view of Secretariat priorities. In early August Bol'shevik combined its usual claim that theoretical education was the basis for all success with a sharp criticism of those party members who ostensibly neglected theoretical study because of their preoccupation with "practical" work. 22 Moreover, the agitprop leaders' views were now incorporated into CC party officials for neglect of theoretical education and failure to monitor their own subordinates' ideological development. 23 In the face of such indications of leadership support for Zhdanov's views, PS seemed to slacken its campaign to turn the Secretariat to production problems. Instead, the journal focused on the cadre directorate's work with personnel, ignored its industrial activity, and even briefly admitted that Marxist-Leninist theory was a "guide to action." 24 Stalin undoubtedly realized that the Nazi-Soviet pact provided the basis for the German attack on Poland in September 1939, but it is difficult to determine whether or not he expected war between Germany and France and Great Britain. 25 Whatever his hopes and fears, the Soviet leadership did expand the Secretariat's means for intervention in industrial management in order to accelerate defense production in the first two months after the invasion of Poland. The first clear indication that the leadership had adopted Malenkov's conception of the Secretariat's proper role appeared in a Pravda editorial in October. On October 17, 1939 Pravda implied that both local party officials and P P O secretaries should play a more active role in the solution of immediate production problems. Pravda criticized local party officials who had "not understood" that the Eighteenth Congress had in fact increased their responsibilities for industrial performance, condemned obkom officials in steelmaking regions for neglecting acute problems of raw materials shortages, and praised PPOs for solving technical problems without waiting for orders from the factory manager.
26
Later that month, Malenkov's views were embodied in a CC resolution on production failures in the critical Donbas region. The CC resolution of October 23, 1939 condemned obkom and gorkom officials for their ostensible neglect of serious shortcomings in coal production-the officials were criticized for ignoring low labor productivity, for ignoring the ineffectiveness of existing work norms and wage scales and the miners' alleged hostility toward new technology, and for failing to help the PPOs use their pravo kontrolia But the proponents of greater Secretariat intervention were not easily cowed. PS continued to press for the intervention of local party officials in industrial enterprises and Pravda published an editorial in May 1940 which not only defined P P O pravo kontrolia in extremely broad terms but also totally ignored Zhdanov's strictures against undermining factory administration. 41 The fall of France had an immediate impact on the Soviet leadership's definition of Secretariat priorities. In June 1940, Soviet leaders decided to mobilize the nation for the possibility of a conflict with Germany. 42 As the Soviet press called for the strengthening of the "economic and defense powers of the Soviet state," state officials were given new authority over both labor and management. In late June, working hours were extended and job transfers prohibited without express permission of enterprise directors; in September the People's Commissariat for State Control was established to bolster "state discipline" and assure the implementation of all governmental decrees, while in October 1940 the control of the People's Commissariats over the training and mobility of the labor force was vastly increased.
43
In July 1940 a CC resolution demanded that all party organizations assure the implementation of the June decree on labor discipline. 44 As a result both divisions of the Secretariat modified their definition of Secretariat priorities; PS not only muted its previous campaign for an extension of Secretariat "economic work" but also temporarily endorsed edinonachalie and narrowed its definition of pravo kontrolia. PS also recognized Sovnarkom authority by emphasizing the need for "state" as well as "party discipline." Bol'shevik also changed its orientation. Although it had resumed its campaign for theoretical education of cadres after the war with Finland, it was also obliged to focus on the need for strict labor discipline. 46 Stalin also apparently decided, in June 1940, to assert full control over the territories assigned to the USSR by the Nazi-Soviet pact. 47 Zhdanov was dispatched to Estonia to guide its absorption into the USSR and his efforts in this area seemed to improve his standing in Stalin's circle. 48 But Zhdanov's triumph proved short-lived. In August 1940 the USSR's diplomatic pressure on Rumania produced an intensification of Soviet-German conflict in the Balkans. 49 The following month the Soviet leadership turned increasingly against Zhdanov's definition of priorities and toward Malenkov's views. In early September 1940, Zhdanov was replaced as director of agitprop by his deputy G. F. Aleksandrov. Although Zhdanov was said to retain responsibility for "supervision" of agitprop, the change was followed by some indications that the leadership was far less supportive of his views. important, the Soviet leadership now decided to increase party officials' supervision of industry. On September 26, 1940, the Politburo ordered the first secretaries of local party organizations to turn their attention to industry and transport. 51 This order was not published at the time, however, and CC publications did not endorse Malenkov's views until after the failure of Soviet diplomatic efforts to stem the deterioration of relations with Germany.
In mid-November 1940, V. M. Molotov, the people's commissar for foreign affairs, was sent to Berlin to resolve a series of divisive issues. Soon after the failure of his mission, 52 CC publications once again called for greater Secretariat intervention in industry.
In November 1940, the cadres directorate's journal resumed its campaign to extend party officials' "economic" responsibilities. PS published an article by G. Popov, the leader of the Moscow gorkom which denounced PPOs for their alleged passivity toward factory managers. 53 Malenkov's report to the Eighteenth Conference coupled a sharp critique of the Sovnarkom's industrial administration with an elaborate brief for increased Secretariat supervision and intervention. He asserted that the widespread production failures of the People's Commissariats could be attributed to bureaucratic methods of leadership, ignorance of local economic conditions and administrative personnel, failure to introduce new technology, and immense waste of raw materials. He charged that local party officials had ignored production problems either because they had focused exclusively on agriculture or because they "incorrectly thought that they did not bear responsibility for the work of industry and transport." 00 Thus Malenkov clearly implied that the Secretariat reform of the Eighteenth Congress had been all too successful in diverting local party officials away from industrial concerns.
Malenkov called for the appointment of "several" secretaries for industry and transport in each gorkom, obkom, kraikom, and CC of republic parties to allow the Secretariat to "share" responsibility for industry with the People's Commissariats. 01 Although some secretaries had probably been appointed to lead the industrial departments created in November 1939, Malenkov apparently now sought to enlarge their number so that they could replace P P O leaders as the major instrument of supervision of industrial activity. Malenkov did not even mention the PPOs and their pravo kontrolia in his report, and he also explicitly endorsed the principle of edinonachalie. Malenkov's apparent modification of his earlier position may have been designed, in part, to diffuse the Politburo commissars' opposition to his conception of "shared" responsibility for industrial administration. In fact, there was some evidence of Sovnarkom resistance to any further extension of Secretariat prerogatives in industry. The agenda for the Eighteenth Conference was amended at the last minute to include a report by N. A. Voznesenskii, a vice-chairman of the Sovnarkom and director of Gosplan. Voznesenskii's report emphasized the Sovnarkom's successes in fulfilling the Five-Year Plan and thereby implicitly challenged Malenkov's charge that the Sovnarkom could not meet production targets. Furthermore, while Voznesenskii approved Malenkov's general conclusion that the party organizations had to give "more attention" to problems of industry and trans- The editorials published in Pravda in the months between the Eighteenth Conference and the German attack on the USSR in June 1941 indicated that the leadership continued to endorse Malenkov's conception of the Secretariat's role. 67 Pravda briefly criticized the industrial secretaries for overriding the factory managers' prerogatives, 68 but there was no evidence of sustained support for Zhdanov's orientation during this period.
The Secretariat of the CC has generally been regarded as the guardian and promulgator of the official version of Soviet ideology. We have seen, however, that Zhdanov and Malenkov each elaborated a variant ideology, one that not only provided guidance for each leader's directorate, but also included a definition of Secretariat leadership. In short, there existed for a period two contending "organizational ideologies" 69 within the Secretariat.
Zhdanov's stress on "consciousness" as the basis for political action and his insistence on the formal study of the texts of Marxism-Leninism provided agitprop officials at every level with a coherent guide to action in dealing with Communists engaged in practical work. On a more fundamental level, Zhdanov's belief that "party-political work" was vital for Secretariat leadership had important implications for party officials' actions.
Zhdanov feared that preoccupation with "economic work" might transform the entire party apparat into merely "another" administrative structure without any special claims for leadership. In Zhdanov's view, Communist Party officials who became preoccupied with production problems would inevitably neglect not only their own theoretical development, but also the recruitment, assignment, education, and monitoring of other party members, eventually becoming indistinguishable from the government officials under their supervision. Focus on "party-political work," however, would protect party officials against any such degeneration. This focus would guarantee officials the proper perspective and the ability to interpret events, while helping them to coordinate a wide range of noneconomic activities.
In contrast, Malenkov's ill-disguised disdain for the study of MarxistLeninist texts, his belief that practice and experience were the only basis for correct action, and his belief that the Secretariat must supply "leadership of the economy" provided local party officials with an ideology that enabled them to supervise, and frequently intervene in, the Sovnarkom's administration of industry.
Malenkov apparently had no qualms about blurring the lines of responsibility between party officials, on the one hand, and Communists who were government bureaucrats, on the other. In fact, he believed that a blurring of authority was essential for effective Secretariat leadership. While Zhdanov implied that the state structure led by the Sovnarkom could operate industry with a minimum of Secretariat intervention, Malenkov insisted that detailed and constant intervention was essential to assure the fulfillment of obligations. What Zhdanov derided as "petty tutelage," Malenkov regarded as "operative management." While Zhdanov believed that preoccupation with "economic work" was a threat to the Secretariat's proper role, Malenkov regarded it as the highest and most important calling of Communist Party officials.
The conflict between these two ideologies was muted during the first months after the German attack on the USSR, but it was revived in 1942-43 and continued until Zhdanov's death in 1948. Although Malenkov was able to resurrect the Secretariat's central "production branch" departments after Zhdanov's death, this organizational change did not end ideological conflict over the proper function of the Secretariat. For example, N. S. Khrushchev's effort to give priority to the Secretariat's "economic work" was resisted by Presidium ministers who sought to preserve the prerogatives of the Council of Ministers and by those CC secretaries who feared an erosion of the Secretariat's "party-political work." Moreover, although Brezhnev does not always use the terminology of his predecessors, his public pronouncements indicate that discord over the Secretariat's proper role continues to plague the Soviet leadership.
